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Abstract This paper is concerned with constraints on the interpretation of
pronominal anaphora, in particular Condition B effects. It aims to contribute to a
particular approach, initiated by Reinhart (Anaphora and semantic interpretation,
1983) and further developed elsewhere. It proposes a modification of Reinhart’s
Interface Rule, and argues that the resulting theory compares favorably with others,
while being compatible with independently motivated general hypotheses about the
interaction between different interpretive mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
The interpretation of anaphoric pronouns is constrained by syntactic structure. One
particular approach to capturing such constraints was initiated by Reinhart (1983).
Her main thesis was that only one type of anaphoric relation, binding, is syntacti-
cally encoded and subject to rules of syntactic well-formedness. She assumed that
other anaphoric relations, such as coreference, are not syntactically encoded and are
therefore not regulated by rules of grammar. Instead, she suggested, there is a
pragmatic principle which implies that coreference is ruled out whenever it yields
exactly the same interpretation as binding.
This approach has been further developed by Heim (1998), Fox (2000), Bu¨ring
(2005b), Reinhart (2006), and Reuland (2008). The aim of the present paper is to
evaluate and refine these analyses. In particular, some previously unnoticed prob-
lems for the analyses of Bu¨ring (2005b) and Reinhart (2006) will be pointed out,
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and a modification of the latter will be proposed. The resulting theory will be argued
to have certain advantages over the analyses of Heim and Bu¨ring. In particular, it
avoids certain controversial assumptions about VP ellipsis that Bu¨ring’s account
requires, and it avoids the assumption that anaphoric relations other than binding are
syntactically represented and constrained, which is what Heim’s account requires.
The idea behind the proposed account can be seen as a particular instance of the
more general hypothesis that ‘hearers minimize interpretive options’ (Reinhart
2006) or of the closely related idea that ‘rejection of a certain interpretation by one
component of the grammar cannot be overruled by other components’ (Reuland
2008). To the extent that the account is empirically correct, it provides support for
both these general hypotheses.
2 Reinhart’s original approach
The main thesis of Reinhart (1983) is that binding relations are encoded in the
syntax and subject to grammatical constraints, whereas other kinds of anaphoric
relations, such as coreference, are not encoded in the syntax, and therefore not
subject to grammatical constraints. Rather, coreference is established contextually,
and restrictions on coreference are of a pragmatic nature.
In order to discuss Reinhart’s proposal in more detail, we must first fix some
formal terminology and notation, as well as some basic assumptions about the
syntax-semantics interface.
2.1 Basic terminology, notation, and assumptions
The most straightforward way to encode binding relations in the syntax is by means
of indices. Let us assume, then, that pronouns enter a syntactic derivation either with
or without an index. If a pronoun comes with an index, we will call that index its
binding index, and we will append the index to the pronoun in subscript (e.g.,
[him1]). Pronouns with a binding index will be treated as bound by some other
determiner phrase; pronouns without a binding index will be treated as referential.
I will assume that determiner phrases may undergo wh-movement or quantifier
raising. If a DP undergoes wh-movement or QR, it receives a binder index n, which
is adjoined to it in superscript (e.g., [who]3). It also leaves behind a trace which has
that same index n as its binding index (e.g., the trace of [who]3 would be [t3]).
(1) [TP X [DP W] Y] ) [TP [DP W]n [TP X tn Y]] (wh-movement)
(2) [TP X [DP Q] Y] ) [TP [DP Q]n [TP X tn Y]] (quantiﬁer raising)
I will assume a two-stage Montagovian syntax-semantics interface: logical forms
are first compositionally mapped to expressions in some type-theoretical language,
and these expressions are in turn interpreted model-theoretically. A pronoun or a
trace with a binding index n is interpreted as a variable xn, and a constituent of the




where X0 is the interpretation of X and Y0 is the interpretation of Y. This compo-
sition rule embodies what Heim and Kratzer (1998) call predicate abstraction. By
way of illustration, the logical form in (4) is mapped to the type-theoretical
expression in (5) (where I use somewhat sloppy notation):
(4) [John]1[t1 loves his1 mother]
(5) JOHN ðkx1x1 LOVES x1’S MOTHER)
We will say that a determiner phrase X binds a pronoun P iff (i) X c-commands P,
(ii) X’s binder index coincides with P’s binding index, and (iii) X does not
c-command any other DP that satisfies (i) and (ii). This notion of binding is what
Heim and Kratzer (1998) and Bu¨ring (2005a) call semantic binding and what
Reinhart (2006) calls A-binding. Notice that, according to this notion, [John] binds
[his] in (4).
As for referential pronouns, i.e. pronouns without a binding index, I will make a
slightly non-standard assumption. I will assume that the formal language contains,
besides standard individual constants and variables, a set of individual proterms.
Moreover, formal expressions are interpreted not only relative to a model and an
assignment function, but also relative to a resolution function. The interpretation of
individual constants is determined by the interpretation function, which is given by
the model; variables are interpreted by the assignment function, and proterms are
interpreted by the resolution function. If a pronoun does not have a binding index, it
is mapped to a proterm, and thus interpreted by the resolution function, which
assigns it a contextually salient individual concept.1
Finally, we will say that two referential determiner phrases A and B corefer in a
particular utterance context C (which furnishes a particular resolution function) iff
A and B denote the same individual in every world that is consistent with the speech
participants’ common assumptions in C. This notion of coreference is often called
presupposed coreference (cf. Bu¨ring 2005a, p. 153).
If a referential pronoun P is supposed to be resolved in such a way that it corefers
with a determiner phrase A, I will write P ¼ A next to the LF in question. For
example, I will write:
1 This setup deviates from that of Heim and Kratzer (1998), which is often taken as a starting point. In
particular, referential pronouns are not treated as free variables here. Bound and referential pronouns are
really dealt with by two separate mechanisms. The main reason for me to take this line here is that it
seems to be the most straightforward way of implementing Reinhart’s distinction. Incidentally, setting
things up in this way has the additional advantage of not having to stipulate that ‘‘no logical form may
contain both bound occurrences and free occurrences of the same index’’ (Heim and Kratzer 1998,
p. 254). Having said this, it should also be noted that the assumed treatment of referential pronouns,
although it will serve our purposes here, becomes problematic as soon as we take ‘discourse reference’
into account. One general treatment of referential pronouns that is, as far as I can see, compatible with
what will be said below, is the one proposed by van der Sandt (1992) and Geurts (1999). However,
spelling out the details of such a treatment would bring along several issues that are orthogonal to the ones
to be discussed here. Therefore, I adopt the ‘toy’-treatment specified above.
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(6) [John]1 [t1 loves his mother] his ¼ John
to indicate that the referential pronoun [his] is supposed to be resolved in such a way
that it corefers with [John].
2.2 Condition B and the Coreference Rule
We are now ready to spell out Reinhart’s proposal in more detail. We will focus on
her analysis of Condition B effects. The relevant empirical generalization is that
pronouns can normally not be interpreted as bound by—or coreferential
with—coarguments.2 For instance, binding is impossible in the following con-
structions:
(7) a. Every girl loves her.
b. Every woman believes her to be a great dancer.
c. Mary asked every boy to wash him.
Coreference is equally impossible in the following examples:
(8) a. Susan loves her. ) her 6¼ Susan
b. Norah believes her to be a great dancer. ) her 6¼ Norah
c. Mary asked John to wash him. ) him 6¼ John
However, Reinhart (1983, p. 169) notes that there are at least two kinds of envi-
ronments in which coreference seems to evade Condition B effects. The first kind of
environment involves focus-sensitive operators like only. For instance, according to
Reinhart, [him] can be interpreted as coreferential with [Max himself] in (9).
(9) Only Max himself voted for him.
The second kind of environment is one in which, in order to establish appropriate
‘contrast’ or ‘parallelism’ between two phrases, a pronoun must be interpreted as
coreferential with one of its coarguments:3;4
(10) I know what John and Mary have in common.
John hates Mary and Mary hates her too.
(11) If everyone voted for Oscar, then certainly Oscar voted for him.
2 Several versions of this generalization have been proposed in the literature. The present formulation,
adapted from (Bu¨ring 2005a, pp. 55–56), is relatively theory-neutral and covers the relevant data. Two
determiner phrases are coarguments iff their h-role and/or case are assigned by the same predicate.
3 Very similar examples were used by Evans (1980) to show that Condition C effects are suppressed in
certain environments. Therefore, examples like (10) and (11) are often attributed to Evans, rather than to
Reinhart. I will likewise refer to (10) and (11) as Evans’ examples from now on.
4 Examples of this kind occur particularly frequently with first and second person pronouns. Horn (2008,
pp. 173–174) provides a list of attested examples.
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I must note here that the judgments of my informants do not always confirm those of
Reinhart. Many speakers find that coreference is marginal in (9), (10), and (11), and
emphasize that there are certainly more natural ways to convey the intended mes-
sages. In the recent literature, several authors have pointed out or acknowledged the
controversial status of these cases (cf. Schlenker 2005; Jacobson 2007; Grodzinsky
2007; Heim 2007). The theories to be discussed here, however, are in large part
designed especially to deal with these cases. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, I
will proceed as if Reinhart’s observations are undisputed.5
So much for the data. Let us now turn to Reinhart’s theoretical proposal. The first
ingredient of her theory is a syntactic constraint, which only applies to binding:6
Def. 1: Condition B
Pronouns cannot be bound by their coarguments.
Besides this syntactic constraint on binding, Reinhart argues that there is a
pragmatic constraint on coreference. The rationale behind this constraint is that it is
always more risky for a speaker to use syntactic structures which contain referential
elements than to use syntactic structures in which anaphoric relations are directly
encoded. This is because referential elements always have to be resolved by the
hearer, and this can go wrong. If anaphoric relations are syntactically encoded,
resolution does not come into play. Reinhart assumes that speakers generally want
to avoid any risk of being misinterpreted, and thus always prefer to use syntactic
structures which contain bound anaphoric elements rather than syntactic structures
which contain referential anaphoric elements. Only if speakers cannot express the
intended meaning using bound anaphora will they use referential elements. This
idea can be implemented as follows:
Def. 2: Coreference Rule
A speaker will never use a logical form LF in a context C if LF is semantically
indistinguishable from one of its binding alternatives in C.
5 The following example, adapted from Heim (1998), is sometimes taken to instantiate a third set of
examples in which coreference is insensitive to Condition B effects.
(i) How can you doubt that the speaker is Zelda? She praises her to the sky.
However, as Heim notes, even though she and her may be intended to refer to the same person, they are
intended to do so through different guises. Technically, they are assigned two distinct individual concepts,
which may be instantiated by the same individual in the actual world but by distinct individuals in other
worlds consistent with the speech participants’ common assumptions. Thus, technically speaking, core-
ference does not obtain here, and the question whether or not it is subject to Condition B effects does not
arise.
6 There is an ongoing debate in the literature about how this constraint should be formulated exactly
(cf. Pollard and Sag 1992; Reinhart and Reuland 1993; Bu¨ring 2005a), and about whether it can be
derived from more general syntactic principles (cf. Reuland 2001). This debate is interesting in its own
right, but orthogonal to the discussion here. The present formulation is adapted from Bu¨ring (2005a, pp.
55–56).
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Def. 3 Binding Alternatives
Let C be a context, let LF be a logical form, and let A and B be two determiner
phrases in LF, such that A and B corefer in C and such that A c-commands B in
LF. Then the structure obtained from LF by:
(i) quantifier raising A in case it has not been raised yet, and
(ii) replacing B with a (possibly reflexive) pronoun bound by A
is called a binding alternative of LF in C.
Let us see how the Coreference Rule captures the relevant data. First consider an
environment where coargument coreference is not available:
(12) Max voted for him.
a. [Max]1 [t1 voted for him] him ¼ Max
b. [Max]1 [t1 voted for himself1]
The Coreference Rule predicts that a speaker will never use (12a), in which [Max]
and [him] are intended to corefer, because (12a) is semantically indistinguishable
from its binding alternative (12b): both express the proposition that Max voted for
Max. A hearer will conclude from this that coreference cannot be intended in (12).
Now, let us see whether the Coreference Rule can deal with environments in
which coargument coreference is exceptionally permitted. First consider a focus
construction:
(13) Only Max himself voted for him.
a. [only] [[Max himself]1 [t1 voted for him]] him ¼ Max himself
b. [only] [[Max himself]1 [t1 voted for himself1]]
This time, the Coreference Rule does not rule out coreference, because the inter-
pretation of (13a) differs from the interpretation of its binding alternative (13b):
(13a) says that the others did not vote for Max, while (13b) says that the others did
not vote for themselves. Finally, consider one of Evans’ examples:
(14) I know what John and Mary have in common.
Mary voted for John and John voted for him too.
a. [John]1 [t1 voted for him] him ¼ John
b. [John]1 [t1 voted for himself1]
The Coreference Rule does not rule out coreference in (14a), because the inter-
pretation of (14a) differs from the interpretation of its binding alternative (14b):
(14a) says that John has the property of having voted for John, and this is indeed the
property that John and Mary are supposed to have in common. (14b) on the other
hand, says that John has the property of having voted for himself, and this is
certainly not the property that John and Mary are supposed to have in common.
So Reinhart’s Coreference Rule accounts for standard Condition B effects on




Heim (1998) observes that at least three aspects of Reinhart’s account need some
further consideration. First, the theory does not explicitly state what it means for one
LF to be semantically indistinguishable from another. One possibility that comes to
mind immediately is that two LFs should be regarded as semantically indistin-
guishable if and only if they express the same proposition. But this would not work:
(14a) and (14b) express the same proposition, but intuitively, at least in the context
of (14), there is a significant semantic difference between them. So the question of
when two LFs are semantically indistinguishable should be addressed more
explicitly.
Second, Reinhart’s account is only concerned with binding and coreference.
There are other kinds of anaphoric relations, which seem to be constrained in similar
ways. For instance, in a sentence like (15), the pronouns [he] and [him] cannot be
interpreted as cobound (i.e., both bound by [every man]).
(15) Every man said he voted for him.
In general, cobinding is just as unacceptable as coreference in Condition B envi-
ronments, and we would like to have a rule that embodies these restrictions all in
one go, rather than separate rules for coreference, cobinding, and yet other kinds of
anaphora.
A third issue that Heim raises is that the Coreference Rule is not compatible with
‘baseline theories’ of VP ellipsis (Sag 1976; Williams 1977).7;8 To see the problem,
consider the following example:
(16) Max called his mother and Bob did too.
The pronoun in the source clause can either be bound, as in (17a), or referential, as
in (17b). According to Sag and Williams (and according to most of the refined
analyses mentioned in footnote 8), (17a) gives rise to the sloppy reading of the
target clause (Bob called Bob’s mother) while (17b) gives rise to the strict reading of
the target clause (Bob called Max’s mother).
(17) a. [Max]1 [t1 called his1 mother]
b. [Max]1 [t1 called his mother] his ¼ Max
But the Coreference Rule rules out (17b), because it is semantically indistinguish-
able from its binding alternative (17a). This means that, on most accounts of VP
7 This issue was also noted and addressed by Grodzinsky and Reinhart (1993, p. 81).
8 In the meantime, the theories of Sag and Williams have been criticized and refined significantly
(cf. Dalrymple et al. 1991; Rooth 1992; Tancredi 1992; Hardt 1993; Pru¨st et al. 1994; Fiengo and May
1994; Heim 1997; Tomioka 1997; Fox 1999; Schwarzschild 1999; Asher et al. 2001; Merchant 2001;
Kehler 2002; Hardt and Romero 2004; Elbourne 2008; Johnson 2008). However, most of these refined
accounts, at least in as far as they assume a distinction between bound and referential pronouns, are still
incompatible with Reinhart’s Coreference Rule.
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ellipsis, the Coreference Rule wrongly predicts that (16) does not have a strict
reading.9
To address these issues, Heim does two things. First, she proposes a new con-
straint, which preserves all the empirical virtues of Reinhart’s Coreference Rule, but
is compatible with a wide range of theories of VP ellipsis and applies not only to
coreference but also to cobinding and other kinds of anaphora. Second, she refines
the notion of semantic indistinguishability. Let us first consider the new constraint.
3.1 The Exceptional Codetermination Rule
Heim’s theory is stated in terms of codetermination, a notion which embraces that
of binding, cobinding, and coreference (and yet other anaphoric relations). It is
recursively defined as follows.
Def. 4: Codetermination
Let C be a context, let LF be a logical form, and let A and B be two DPs in LF.
We say that A and B are codetermined in LF/C iff
(i) A binds B in LF, or
(ii) A and B corefer in C, or
(iii) There is a third DP which is codetermined with A and B in LF/C.
The first ingredient of Heim’s theory is a revised version of Condition B, which
prohibits codetermination, rather than binding.
Def. 5: Heim’s Condition B
Pronouns cannot be codetermined with their coarguments.
The second ingredient of the theory is a rule which states that codetermination is
sometimes exceptionally allowed.
Def. 6: Exceptional Codetermination Rule
Let LF be a logical form in which a pronoun is codetermined with, but not bound by
one of its coarguments. Then, LF is (marginally) allowed, in violation of Condition B,
if it is semantically distinguishable from its binding alternative in the given context.
The reader is invited to check that Heim’s Condition B and her Exceptional
Codetermination Rule account for regular Condition B effects—not only ones
involving coreference, but also ones involving cobinding and other kinds of
codetermination. The theory also accounts for the exceptional cases in which
9 It could be objected that binding and coreference are semantically distinguishable here, exactly because
they give rise to different interpretations of the elided VP. But, as noted by Grodzinsky and Reinhart
(1993, p. 81) and Heim (1998, p. 241), this would mean that coreference should also be be allowed in
examples like the following:
(i) John saw him, and Bill did too.
Such examples indicate that the Coreference Rule must operate locally, e.g., on the smallest clause




codetermination is allowed in Condition B environments. Finally, it is compatible
with a wide range of theories of VP ellipsis: (17b) is no longer ruled out.
3.2 Semantic indistinguishability
When should two logical forms be regarded as semantically indistinguishable? For
one thing, they should express the same proposition. But Heim notes that Evans’
examples, repeated in (18) and (19), show that there is more to it.
(18) I know what John and Mary have in common.
Mary voted for John and John voted for him too.
(19) If everyone voted for Oscar, then certainly Oscar voted for him.
Heim suggests that these are typical cases in which structured meaning matters. In
(18), there is a certain property P that Mary and John are supposed to have in
common, namely, the property [kxx voted for John] of having voted for John. If
such a particular property is under discussion, then an LF which says that John has
the property P is to be distinguished from an LF which says that John has the
property [kxx voted for x] (even though these two LFs as a whole denote the same
proposition). The same reasoning can be applied to the example in (19), where it is
the property of having voted for Oscar that is under discussion. Thus, Heim’s
general proposal is that, whenever a particular property P is under discussion, and
LF and LF0 are two logical forms such that P is denoted by some part of LF but not
by any part of LF0, then LF should be distinguished from LF0, even if both express
the same proposition. One way of implementing this intuition is to define semantic
indistinguishability not only in terms of propositional content, but also in terms of
focus values (see Roelofsen 2008a for the details of such an implementation).
The three issues that Heim raised concerning Reinhart’s original proposal are
now resolved. It must be noted, however, that the general idea behind Reinhart’s
theory has been lost: Heim’s theory cannot be derived from the assumption that
speakers generally seek to avoid risks of being misinterpreted. Moreover, Heim
assumes that codetermination—and not just binding—is subject to rules of syntactic
well-formedness (in particular, her version of Condition B). This can only be
effectuated if codetermination is syntactically encoded, and that requires a rather
significant complication of the syntactic representation of anaphoric relations. Heim
bites the bullet and spells out a specific way of encoding codetermination syntac-
tically. Bu¨ring (2005b) proposes an alternative account, which is specifically aimed
at avoiding this complication.
4 Locality
Bu¨ring appeals to a constraint on binding proposed and independently motivated by
Fox (2000). Let us first consider Fox’s proposal, and then Bu¨ring’s application of it.
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4.1 Rule H
The general idea pursued by Fox (2000) is that grammar is subject to certain
economy constraints. Such constraints filter out logical forms whose interpretation
coincides with that of alternative logical forms that are in some sense simpler, more
economical. Rule H is a specific instance of this kind of economy constraints.
Def. 7: Rule H
A pronoun P can be bound by an antecedent A only if there is no closer ante-
cedent B such that it is possible to bind P to B and get the same semantic
interpretation.
Empirical evidence for Rule H mainly comes from a notorious puzzle concerning
VP ellipsis, dating back to Dahl (1974). Consider the following sentence:
(20) Max said that he called his mother and Bob did too.
Notice that the second conjunct contains an elided VP, and that the overt VP in the
first conjunct contains two pronouns. We may expect, then, that this sentence has at
least four readings: one in which both pronouns are interpreted strictly, one in which
they are both interpreted sloppily, and two ‘mixed’ readings where one of the
pronouns is interpreted strictly and the other sloppily. Surprisingly, one of these
mixed readings is not available (in neutral contexts):
(21) a. . . . Bob too said that Max called Max’s mother. [strict-strict]
b. . . . Bob too said that Bob called Bob’s mother. [sloppy-sloppy]
c. . . . Bob too said that Bob called Max’s mother. [sloppy-strict]
d. #. . . Bob too said that Max called Bob’s mother. [strict-sloppy]
Rule H accounts for this observation. To see this, consider the possible logical forms
of the source clause in (20):
(22) a. [Max]1 [t1 said [he1]
2 [t2 called his2 mother]] (21a)
b. [Max]1 [t1 said [he1]
2 [t2 called his1 mother]] (21a)
c. [Max]1 [t1 said [he]
2 [t2 called his mother]] he ¼ his ¼ Max (21b)
d. [Max]1 [t1 said [he]
2 [t2 called his2 mother]] he ¼ Max (21b)
e. [Max]1 [t1 said [he1]
2 [t2 called his mother]] his ¼ Max (21c)
f. [Max]1 [t1 said [he]
2 [t2 called his1 mother]] he ¼ Max (21d)
I have indicated which reading of (20) is associated with each of these logical forms,
on most prevailing accounts of VP ellipsis. Now notice that Rule H rules out (22b)
and (22f): (22b) is ruled out because it is semantically indistinguishable from the
more economical (22a), and (22f) is ruled out because it is semantically indistin-
guishable from the more economical (22d). Therefore, Rule H correctly predicts that
(21a), (21b), and (21c) are possible readings of (20), but (21d) is not.
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4.2 Have Local Binding!
Bu¨ring (2005b) observes that one of the main reasons for Heim to impose a syn-
tactic constraint on codetermination, rather than binding, was that Reinhart’s ori-
ginal account could not deal with Condition B effects on anaphoric relations other
than binding and coreference. For instance, Reinhart’s account failed to rule out
cobinding in (23):
(23) Every man said that he voted for him.
Bu¨ring observes that once Fox’s Rule H is adopted, cobinding is ruled out in (23).
He notes that (24), which exhibits cobinding, is semantically indistinguishable from
(25), where binding is established locally.
(24) [Every man]1 [t1 said that [he1]
2 [t2 voted for him1]]
(25) [Every man]1 [t1 said that [he1]
2 [t2 voted for him2]]
Thus, Bu¨ring argues, the complications proposed by Heim become superfluous. He
proposes to return to the simple formulation of Condition B (as in Def. 1) and to
adopt Reinhart’s original Coreference Rule alongside Fox’s Rule H. Finally, he
observes that the latter two constraints can actually be collapsed into one:
Def. 8: Have Local Binding! (HLB)
For any two determiner phrases A and B, if A is in a position to bind B (i.e. if it
c-commands B and B is not bound in A’s c-command domain already), then A
must bind B, unless that changes the interpretation.
The reader is invited to check that this constraint does indeed provide a general
account of Condition B effects, in particular for those cases in which coreference
and other kinds of codetermination are exceptionally permitted.
It must be noted, however, that it is not quite clear what should be regarded as the
general idea behind HLB. Reinhart’s Coreference Rule and Fox’s Rule H were both
derived from general ideas about the workings of grammar and the behavior of
speakers in discourse. However, these ideas seem to be quite independent, and it is
not easy to see how they could be unified. Thus, even though HLB embodies an
elegant unification of the Coreference Rule and Rule H at the definitional level, it is
not clear whether this unification can also be carried through at the conceptual level.
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, HLB is not compatible with minimal
assumptions about VP ellipsis. That is, in combination with most prevailing theories
of VP ellipsis, HLB yields wrong predictions both for cases like (16)—which were
already seen to be problematic for Reinhart’s account—and for the more intricate
pattern found in Dahl’s puzzle. To see this, first consider (16), repeated here as (26):
(26) Max called his mother and Bob did too.
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HLB predicts that coreference is impossible in the source clause. Thus, on most
accounts of VP ellipsis, HLB wrongly predicts that the target clause does not have a
strict reading. As for Dahl’s puzzle, HLB allows (22a) but rules out all the other LFs
in (22). This means that, again, on most accounts of VP ellipsis, HLB wrongly
predicts that (21a) is the only possible reading of (20). So Bu¨ring is forced to make
very specific assumptions about VP ellipsis. He adopts a proposal originally due to
Fox (2000):10
Def. 9: DP Parallelism
Corresponding determiner phrases in the antecedent and elided VPs must either:
(i) have the same referential value, or
(ii) be bound in parallel in their respective conjuncts.
Def. 10: Referential Value
The referential value of a determiner phrase A is:
(i) the individual to which A refers, or
(ii) the referential value of the DP that binds A.
Neither Fox nor Bu¨ring says explicitly what it means for two determiner phrases to
be ‘bound in parallel’. Nevertheless, we could ask whether the generalization that
DP Parallelism seems to embody is empirically correct. I think that it is too strong,
and arguably also too weak. That it is too strong is illustrated by a well-known
example from Rooth (1992):
(27) First John told Mary that I was bad-mouthing her. Then Sue heard I was.
DP Parallelism erroneously rules out the sloppy reading of (27), which says that Sue
heard that I was bad-mouthing Sue. This is because such a sloppy reading would
involve ‘non-parallel’ binding of the pronouns in the elided VP and its antecedent.
Rooth’s account of examples like (27) essentially amounts to requiring that the
elided VP is contained in a constituent that ‘contrasts appropriately’ with another
constituent in the surrounding discourse, where ‘appropriate contrast’ is formalized
in terms of focus values. Many subsequent theories of VP ellipsis have adopted or
refined Rooth’s proposal (cf. Heim 1997; Tomioka 1997; Fox 1999; Merchant 2001;
Hardt 2008). All such theories are compatible with Heim’s ECR, but not with HLB.
It can also be argued that DP Parallelism is too weak (although such arguments
could always be countered by pointing out that there may be constraints on VP
ellipsis besides DP Parallelism that rule out the relevant readings). One problematic
kind of example is the following:
(28) Yesterday, only Bob called his mother. Today, only Max did.
10 The present formulation of DP Parallelism is taken from Bu¨ring (2005a, p. 132). A slightly different




DP Parallelism predicts that there is a reading of (28) which says that yesterday,
Bob was the only one with the property [kxx called x’s mother], while today, Max
was the only one with the property [kxx called Bob’s mother]. This reading is not
attested.
Other cases in which DP Parallelism is too weak are certain instances of
cascaded ellipsis. Consider, for instance:
(29) Bob called his mother, and Max did too. But Tom didn’t.
DP Parallelism wrongly predicts that (29) has a so-called mixed reading which can
be paraphrased as follows:
(30) Bob called Bob’s mother, and Max called Max’s mother.
But Tom didn’t call Max’s mother.
It must immediately be noted that there are also certain instances of cascaded
ellipsis where mixed readings are available, an observation going back at least to
Schiebe (1973) and Dahl (1973). Fox (2000, p. 117) presents the following example
(explicitly in support of DP Parallelism):
(31) Smithers thinks that his job sucks, and Homer does, too. But Marge doesn’t.
Notice that (31) is structurally analogous to (29). However, (31) does have a mixed
reading, at least for people who recognize that it is about a popular American
sitcom, in which Marge is Homer’s wife and does not have a job of her own. The
availability of such a mixed reading is predicted by DP Parallelism, and not by most
other theories of VP ellipsis, at least not without additional stipulations. However, I
think it goes too far to say that this really is an argument in favor of DP Parallelism,
and against most other theories of VP ellipsis. DP Parallelism has trouble with cases
like (29), while other theories struggle with cases like (31). To the best of my
knowledge, none of the available theories provides a completely satisfactory
account of cascaded ellipsis. My hunch is that mixed readings arise in cases like
(31) because such constructions somehow license inference in the interpretation of
the elided VP. It is well known that the interpretation of elided VPs must involve
inference in certain cases (cf. Webber 1978; Hardt 1993; Sag 2006). Unfortunately,
not much is known about the exact circumstances under which inference is licensed
(although see Hardt 2005 for a proposal). I will leave this issue open here, but must
conclude that cascaded ellipsis does not in general provide evidence for DP Par-
allelism.
Thus, HLB requires a very specific account of VP ellipsis, which—at least in its
present formulation—seems problematic. Notice that HLB essentially inherits this
problem from Reinhart’s Coreference Rule. I think that the persistence of this
problem was in fact the main reason for Reinhart herself to eventually depart from
her 1983 theory and develop a new account in the mid-1990s.
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5 Reinhart’s Interface Rule
Reinhart’s original approach was based on two assumptions. First, binding is
encoded in syntactic structure, while coreference is not; and second, speakers
generally try to avoid risks of being misinterpreted. Reinhart argued that it follows
from these two assumptions that speakers generally prefer to use bound pronouns,
which explicitly encode the intended anaphoric relations, rather than referential
pronouns, which may well not be resolved as intended.
In her later work, Reinhart concludes that these assumptions eventually yield the
wrong predictions and should be reconsidered. More specifically, she proposes to
leave the first assumption intact (binding is encoded in syntactic structure, core-
ference is not) but to replace the second assumption, which is about speakers, with
an alternative assumption about hearers. The general idea she pursues in Reinhart
(2006) is that hearers minimize interpretive options. In the specific case of anaphora,
this means that if a certain interpretation is ruled out by grammatical restrictions on
binding, then a hearer will recognize that this interpretation was not intended, even
if it could in principle be derived via other anaphoric mechanisms. In other words,
interpretations which are ruled out by restrictions on binding cannot be sneaked in
via other anaphoric mechanisms. Reinhart points out that the existence of such an
interpretive restriction would be extremely useful. For communication to proceed
efficiently, it is crucial for a hearer to keep interpretive options to a minimum at all
times.
Reinhart, (2006) formalizes this idea in terms of a notion she calls covaluation.
Def. 11: Covaluation
Let C be a context, let LF be a logical form, and let A and B be two DPs in LF.
Then A and B are covalued in LF/C iff
(i) A does not bind B and B does not bind A in LF, and
(ii) A and B are cobound in LF or A and B corefer in C.
Notice that covaluation is essentially a generic term for coreference and cobinding.
As such, it is more general than coreference alone, but less general than Heim’s
notion of codetermination, which covered other kinds of anaphora as well. Reinhart
proposes the following constraint on covaluation:
Def. 12: Interface Rule
A logical form LF is ruled out if one of its binding alternatives LF0 is such that
a. LF and LF0 are semantically indistinguishable, and
b. The transition from LF to LF0 is illicit, because
(i) LF0 is ruled out by restrictions on binding (Condition B), or
(ii) The existing binding relations in LF are not preserved in LF0, or
(iii) LF0 is ruled out by another application of the Interface Rule.
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The notion of a binding alternative has to be revised slightly. The only difference
between Def. 13 below and the earlier Def. 3 is that in Def. 13 A and B are supposed
to be covalued, while in Def. 3 A and B were supposed to corefer.
Def. 13: Binding Alternatives
Let C be a context, let LF be a logical form, and let A and B be two determiner
phrases such that A c-commands B in LF and such that A and B are covalued in LF/
C. Then the structure obtained from LF by
(i) quantifier raising A in case it has not been raised yet
(ii) replacing B with a pronoun or trace bound by A
is called a binding alternative of LF.
Let us see whether the Interface Rule accounts for the relevant data. Let us first
consider (12), repeated here as (32), which exhibits a standard Condition B effect
on coreference. The Interface Rule correctly rules out (32a) because it is semanti-
cally indistinguishable from its binding alternative in (32b), and (32b) violates
Condition B.
(32) Max voted for him.
a. [Max]1 [t1 voted for him] him ¼ Max
b. [Max]1 [t1 voted for him1]
Now, let us see whether the Interface Rule can deal with Condition B environments
in which coreference is exceptionally permitted. Consider (13), repeated here as
(33):
(33) Only Max himself voted for him.
a. [only] [[Max himself]1 [t1 voted for him]] him ¼ Max himself
b. [only] [[Max himself]1 [t1 voted for him1]]
The Interface Rule does not rule out coreference here, because (33a) is not
semantically indistinguishable from its binding alternative in (33b). Intuitively
speaking, coreference is not sneaking in an interpretation that is ruled out by
restrictions on binding, but rather gives rise to an interpretation that is different from
what would be obtained from binding. Evans’ examples are dealt with in a similar
way. So the Interface Rule accounts for standard Condition B effects on corefer-
ence, and also for the cases in which coreference is exceptionally allowed.
The issues that the Coreference Rule was facing and which were addressed by
Heim’s Exceptional Codetermination Rule are also satisfactorily dealt with by the
Interface Rule. In particular, the Interface Rule does not only account for cases of
illicit coreference, but also for cases of illicit cobinding, and it allows strict identity
readings in VP ellipsis. First consider a case of illicit cobinding:
(34) Every man said that he voted for him.
a. [Every man]1 [t1 said that [he1]
2 [t2 voted for him1]]
b. [Every man]1 [t1 said that [he1]
2 [t2 voted for him2]]
Condition B effects in two simple steps 129
123
The logical form in (34a), in which [he1] and [him1] are cobound, should be ruled
out. The Interface Rule accounts for this: (34a) is ruled out because it is semanti-
cally indistinguishable from its binding alternative (34b), and (34b) violates Con-
dition B.
Next, consider the simple case of VP ellipsis in (16), repeated here as (35):
(35) Max called his mother and Bob did too.
The Coreference Rule prohibited coreference in the source clause and thus ruled out
the strict reading. The Interface Rule, on the other hand, does not rule out core-
ference in the source clause (coreference is only ruled out if binding is, too, and
binding is certainly possible here) and thus correctly admits the strict reading
of (35).
Finally, Reinhart claims that the Interface Rule also accounts for Dahl’s puzzle.
To see whether this is indeed the case, let me briefly resume the puzzle:
(20) Max said that he called his mother. Bob did too.
(21) a. . . . Bob too said that Bob called Bob’s mother.
b. . . . Bob too said that Max called Max’s mother.
c. . . . Bob too said that Bob called Max’s mother.
d. #. . .Bob too said that Max called Bob’s mother.
(22) a. [Max]1 [t1 said [he1]
2 [t2 called his2 mother]] (21a)
b. [Max]1 [t1 said [he1]
2 [t2 called his1 mother]] (21a)
c. [Max]1 [t1 said [he]
2 [t2 called his mother]] he ¼ his ¼ Max (21b)
d. [Max]1 [t1 said [he]
2 [t2 called his2 mother]] he ¼ Max (21b)
e. [Max]1 [t1 said [he1]
2 [t2 called his mother]] his ¼ Max (21c)
f. [Max]1 [t1 said [he]
2 [t2 called his1 mother]] he ¼ Max (21d)
The Interface Rule is supposed to do two things: first, it is supposed to rule out (22f)
as a logical form of the source clause, and thus (21d) as a possible reading of the
target clause. Second, it is supposed to allow enough logical forms of the source
clause to derive each of the legitimate readings of the target clause. In particular, it
should not rule out both (22a) and (22b), or both (22c) and (22d), or (22e).
Let us see whether this is indeed established. First consider (22f). This LF is
indeed ruled out. To see this, we have to consider the binding alternative of (22f),
which is (22b). First observe that (22f) and (22b) are semantically indistinguishable.
Next, observe that (22b) is ruled out by another application of the Interface Rule:
(22b) is semantically indistinguishable from its binding alternative, (22a), and (22a)
does not leave the existing binding relations in (22b) intact: [his] is no longer bound
by [Max] in (22a). So (22b) is ruled out by the Interface Rule, and this means that
(22f) itself is prohibited as well.
So far so good. The problem is that the Interface Rule also rules out (22e), by
exactly the same line of reasoning: (22e)’s binding alternative is (22b), just like that
of (22f). (22e) and (22b) are semantically indistinguishable, and we have already
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seen that (22b) is ruled out by the Interface Rule. Thus, (22e) is ruled out as well. As
a consequence, (21c) is wrongly excluded as a possible reading of the target clause.
Thus, the Interface Rule does not account for Dahl’s puzzle. Note that it is not
just too weak in this respect. If this were the case, we could simply adopt an
independent account of Dahl’s puzzle, such as Fox’s Rule H, to complement the
Interface Rule. The problem is more serious, though. The Interface Rule is too
strong. It rules out one of the readings of Dahl’s sentence that is actually attested.
Apart from this empirical problem, there are two other aspects of Reinhart’s
theory that call for further attention. First, there is a striking discrepancy between
(the simplicity of) the intuition behind the Interface Rule and (the complexity of) its
actual formulation. Recall the basic intuition: interpretations which are ruled out by
restrictions on binding cannot be sneaked in via other anaphoric mechanisms. We
should expect, then, that the formal statement of the rule should say something like:
a logical form LF is ruled out if it is semantically indistinguishable from one of its
binding alternatives LF0, and LF0 is ruled out by constraints on binding. The actual
formulation of the Interface Rule is much more complicated. In particular, it
additionally requires that the existing binding relations in LF are preserved in LF0
and that LF0 is not ruled out by recursive applications of the Interface Rule.
The second issue that needs further attention is that the Interface Rule is not only
undesirably complex in its formulation, but also in its workings. The analysis of a
sentence like (36) illustrates this:
(36) Max said that he voted for him.
First note that a simpler example, like Max voted for him, is straightforwardly
accounted for: Condition B prohibits binding and (as a consequence) the Interface
Rule prohibits covaluation. We would like the Interface Rule to deal with the more
complex example in (36) in a similar way. But this turns out not to be the case. To
see this, consider the logical form in (37).
(37) [Max]1 [t1 said that he voted for him1] he ¼ Max
The reading represented by (37) is not an available reading for (36), so the LF
should be ruled out. To see if it is, we should consider its binding alternative:
(38) [Max]1 [t1 said that he1 voted for him1]
Is the transition from (37) to (38) illicit? Only if (38) is ruled out by another
application of the Interface Rule. To see if it is, we must consider the binding
alternative of (38):
(39) [Max]1 [t1 said that [he1]
2 [t2 voted for him2]]
The fact that [he] binds [him] in (39) is in conflict with Condition B. Now we can
start to calculate backwards to the original LF: (39) is ruled out by Condition B;
therefore, the Interface Rule rules out (38); and therefore, another application of the
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Interface Rule rules out (37). So the Interface Rule does account for the illegitimacy
of (37), but in a roundabout way. And more complex examples can easily be
constructed of course.
In conclusion, Reinhart’s Interface Rule successfully accounts for Condition B
effects. Moreover, it allows for strict readings in VP ellipsis. But it does not account
for Dahl’s puzzle, its actual formulation is more complex than its underlying
intuition, and its workings are (sometimes) undesirably complicated.
6 Rule S
Now we come to the positive contribution of the present paper. I will propose an
interface rule that is simpler than the one proposed by Reinhart, but still reflects the
underlying intuition. The rule will be referred to as Rule S; it literally prohibits
sneaking in interpretations that are ruled out by restrictions on binding. We will see
that Rule S compares favorably to all proposals considered so far.
Recall, again, the basic intuition underlying Reinhart’s Interface Rule:
Interpretations which are ruled out by restrictions on binding cannot be
sneaked in via other anaphoric mechanisms.
Let me first consider, and slightly revise, Reinhart’s formal rendering of other
anaphoric mechanisms. Reinhart assumes that these mechanisms are all instances of
covaluation (cobinding and coreference). But the notion of covaluation does not
cover all the relevant instances of anaphoric relatedness. In particular, it does not
cover the indirect instances of anaphoric relatedness via third parties, so to speak.
We have just seen in Sect. 5 that it took various recursive applications of the
Interface Rule to rule out logical forms like (40) below, whereas (41) was ruled out
in one simple step.
(40) [Max]1 [t1 said that he voted for him1] he ¼ Max
(41) [Max voted for him] him ¼ Max
Essentially, this is because the indirect way in which [he] and [him] are anaphor-
ically related in (40) does not count as covaluation. The complication can easily be
avoided by adopting Heim’s notion of codetermination instead of Reinhart’s notion
of covaluation. The definition is repeated here for convenience.
Def. 14: Codetermination
Let C be a context, let LF be a logical form, and let A and B be two DPs in LF.
We say that A and B are codetermined in LF/C iff
(i) A binds B in LF, or
(ii) A and B corefer in C, or
(iii) There is a third DP which is codetermined with A and B in LF/C.
Next, I propose the following simplified interface rule:
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Def. 15: Rule S (preliminary version)
A logical form is illicit if it is semantically indistinguishable from one of
its binding alternatives LF0, and LF0 is ruled out by constraints on binding
(Condition B).
The notion of a binding alternative has to be slightly revised again. The only
difference between Def. 16 and Def. 13 (Sect. 5) is that in the former A and B are
supposed to be codetermined, while in the latter A and B were supposed to
covalued.
Def. 16: Binding Alternatives
Let C be a context, let LF be a logical form, and let A and B be two determiner
phrases such that A c-commands B in LF, A and B are codetermined in LF/C, but
A does not bind B in LF. Then the structure obtained from LF by
(i) quantifier raising A in case it has not been raised yet, and
(ii) replacing B with a pronoun or trace bound by A.
is called a binding alternative of LF.
Notice that Rule S is in correspondence with Reinhart’s original intuition. Also, the
workings of Rule S are as straightforward as we would like them to be. In particular,
(40) is now dealt with just like (41): codetermination is ruled out in one simple step.
Rule S is weaker than the Interface Rule. In particular, it allows too many
(instead of too few) readings of the target clause in Dahl’s puzzle. In fact, Rule S
does not rule out any of the possible logical forms of the source clause of Dahl’s
sentence, because none of their respective binding alternatives violates Condition B.
Thus, Rule S accounts just for Condition B effects, and Dahl’s puzzle must be
accounted for in some other way, for instance by Fox’s Rule H.11;12 The crucial
point, however, is that the excessive strength of Reinhart’s Interface Rule has been
tempered.
11 Alternative accounts of Dahl’s puzzle have been proposed by Kehler (1993), Fiengo and May (1994),
Sem (1994), Schlenker (2005), Ja¨ger (2005), Hardt (2008), and Kehler and Bu¨ring (2008), possibly
among others. In Roelofsen (2008b), I discuss a slight variant of Dahl’s example that is problematic for
most, if not all, of these analyses, and propose a modification of Rule H. In Roelofsen (2008a), I discuss
yet another possible approach. In any case, most of these accounts are directly compatible with Rule S (in
some cases, this is not immediately clear, as the underlying assumptions about the nature of pronominal
anaphora and the syntax-semantics interface are rather different from the ones adopted here).
12 Reuland (2008, p. 16) explicitly argues that Condition B effects and Dahl’s puzzle should be ac-
counted for by two distinct mechanisms, because Condition B effects are ‘‘categorical, and hard or
impossible to obviate,’’ while ‘‘the local binding requirement expressed by Rule H and its alternatives is
quite sensitive to plausibility considerations.’’ To the extent that this empirical difference is real, it
supports the present proposal.
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6.1 Further simplification
There is one aspect of Rule S (and of the other constraints discussed so far) that has
perhaps not been paid sufficient attention to. Namely, strictly speaking, Rule S does
not apply to plain logical forms. Rather, it applies to what we may call ‘extended
logical forms’, which include a specification of how the referential pronouns
occurring in the logical form are supposed to be resolved. Having drawn attention to
this subtlety, we may content ourselves with the present formulation of Rule S.
However, there is a simpler way to state the constraint, which avoids the issue
altogether.
Def. 17: Rule S (final version)
Any interpretation of a given clause X that could be obtained via a logical form
of X that violates Condition B (or other syntactic constraints on binding) is illicit.
In this formulation, Rule S directly rules out interpretations rather than ‘extended
logical forms’. Instead of checking the binding alternatives of each extended logical
form that involves some form of codetermination, it directly filters out any inter-
pretation that could be obtained via a logical form that violates constraints on
binding. Thus, there is no comparison of extended logical forms. Rather—and this
brings us perhaps even closer to Reinhart’s original intuition—once an interpreta-
tion is filtered out by syntactic constraints on binding, it is also prevented from
being established via other interpretive strategies.
6.2 Rule S and Heim’s ECR
It turns out that Rule S, in combination with the standard version of Condition B, is
empirically equivalent to Heim’s ECR together with her own, stronger version of
Condition B. The standard version of Condition B is only concerned with binding: it
rules out logical forms in which a pronoun is bound by one of its coarguments. Rule
S, then, extends this restriction to codetermination: it rules out logical forms in
which a pronoun is codetermined with one of its coarguments, except when such
logical forms are semantically distinguishable from their binding alternatives. In
Heim’s system, the division of labor between Condition B and the ECR is just a
little bit different. Heim’s version of Condition B is directly concerned with
codetermination: it rules out any logical form in which a pronoun is codetermined
with one of its coarguments. The ECR, then, takes care of the exceptions to this rule:
it says that a logical form in which a pronoun is codetermined with (but not bound
by) one of its coarguments is exceptionally allowed if it is semantically distin-
guishable from its binding alternative. Thus, both systems make exactly the same
predictions. The fact that they were arrived at via different routes could be con-
sidered a positive sign in itself.
The main advantage of Rule S over the ECR is that it allows us to stick to the
light version of Condition B, which is only concerned with binding. This means that




6.3 Rule S and Bu¨ring’s HLB
HLB is much stronger than Rule S. First of all, HLB incorporates the effects of
Fox’s Rule H, thus accounting for Dahl’s puzzle, about which Rule S has nothing to
say. Moreover, HLB also incorporates the effects of Reinhart’s Coreference Rule,
which in itself is already stronger than Rule S. And we have seen that this is
problematic. On most accounts of VP ellipsis, the Coreference Rule—and therefore
also HLB—prohibit strict readings in basic cases of VP ellipsis, and also rule out
readings of Dahl’s sentence that are in fact available. To make the right predictions,
HLB must be combined with a very specific theory of VP ellipsis, which, at least in
its present formulation, seems to be rather problematic. Rule S avoids this problem.
It is compatible with virtually any account of VP ellipsis (including DP Parallelism).
Thus, the weakness of Rule S is a virtue rather than a vice. It seems to do exactly
what is needed to capture Condition B effects, and nothing more than that.
6.4 The bigger picture
Rule S is a direct implementation of the idea that interpretations that are ruled out
by syntactic constraints on binding cannot be sneaked in via other anaphoric
mechanisms. As mentioned in Sect. 5, Reinhart (2006) presents this idea as a
particular instance of the more general hypothesis that ‘hearers minimize inter-
pretive options’. She points out that there are a priori reasons to believe that hearers
adopt such a strategy. Namely, doing so would significantly restrict their processing
load. However, real support for the hypothesis can of course only come from
empirical considerations. In order to provide such support, Reinhart (2006) attempts
to show that the effects of minimizing interpretive options are not only exhibited by
the interpretation of anaphora but also by the assignment of quantifier scope. Rule S
refines Reinhart’s account of anaphora. Thus, to the extent that its predictions are
empirically correct, it provides evidence for the underlying general hypothesis.
Reuland (2008) points out that the idea underlying Rule S does not necessarily
have to be considered a particular instance of the hypothesis that hearers minimize
interpretive options. It can also be seen as an instance of a closely related, but
different idea, namely that rejection of a certain interpretation by one component of
the language system cannot be overruled by another component.
Reuland argues on empirical grounds that this idea may actually be more suitable
than Reinhart’s principle of minimizing interpretive options. I will not present
Reuland’s argument in detail here, and I will remain agnostic for now on which of
these two general hypotheses will ultimately turn out to be more appropriate. The
pertinent observation to make is just that Rule S, if correct, provides support for both.
7 Some remarks on alternative approaches
Reinhart’s approach to capturing Condition B effects has been particularly promi-
nent in the literature, but several alternatives have been proposed as well. I cannot
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do justice to all of these alternative accounts here, but I will briefly discuss two of
them: the pragmatic account of Dowty (1980), Sadock (1983), Levinson (2000), and
Huang (2000), among others, and the direct compositional account of Jacobson
(2007).13
Proponents of the pragmatic account argue that Condition B effects are the result
of a division of labor between regular pronouns and reflexive pronouns. They
assume that reflexive pronouns are more informative than regular pronouns (since
regular pronouns are ambiguous, while reflexive pronouns enforce a particular
‘reflexive’ interpretation). Therefore, they argue, the use of a regular pronoun
implicates that a reflexive interpretation is not intended (just as Some students
passed the test implicates that not all students passed the test).
The main problem with this proposal, as has also been noted by Jacobson (2007),
is that Principle B effects are not cancelable in the way implicatures generally are.
To see this, consider the contrast between (42) and (43):
(42) a. Some students passed the test.
b. In fact, it is possible that all of them passed.
(43) a. John thinks that Bill voted for him.
b. In fact, it is possible that John thinks that Bill voted for himself.
Example (42a) implicates that not all students passed the test. This implicature is
canceled in (42b). It is a characteristic feature of implicatures that they are can-
celable in this way. Thus, if Principle B effects are implicatures, we should expect
that they are cancelable too. Example (43) shows that this is not the case. So, at face
value, pragmatic inference patterns do not seem to constitute a suitable account of
Condition B effects.
However, it does seem plausible, at least to me, that pragmatic inference patterns
have played an important role in the diachronic realization of Condition B effects
(as described, for instance, by Levinson 2000). The strict grammatical constraints on
pronominal anaphora that we observe today should then be viewed as resulting from
such pragmatic inference patterns through a process of ‘conventionalization’.
I believe that this approach is well worth further exploring (see Roelofsen 2008a for
some more discussion).
The direct compositional account of Jacobson (2007) assumes that pronouns
belong to a different syntactic category than ordinary determiner phrases. It assumes
furthermore that a transitive verb normally takes an ordinary determiner phrase as
its argument. To take a pronoun as its argument, the verb must be transformed, and
this transformation has an impact on the meaning of the verb: it becomes undefined
for the reflexive pairs in the original denotation. Take, for instance, the verb to
praise. This verb denotes a function from pairs of individuals to truth values. The
function maps a pair hx; yi to 1 if x praises y, and to 0 if x does not praise y. Now, to
take a pronoun as its argument, the verb must be transformed, and as a result of this
13 Some other recent proposals worth mentioning are those of Kiparsky (2002), Schlenker (2005), and
Heim (2007) (see also the second part of Roelofsen 2008a).
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transformation the denotation of the verb becomes a partial function from pairs of
individuals to truth values. It maps hx; yi to 1 if x 6¼ y and x praises y; it maps hx; yi
to 0 if x 6¼ y and x does not praise y; but it is undefined in case x ¼ y. Thus,
Jacobson attributes Condition B effects to the very core machinery of syntactic and
semantic composition. Given the above assumptions, it follows directly from the
way in which lexical items are composed into larger linguistic entities that transitive
verbs with pronominal arguments can only apply to pairs consisting of two distinct
individuals.
This mechanism provides a general account of Condition B effects, not only on
binding, but also on cobinding, coreference, and other kinds of codetermination.
And it does so in one fell swoop, without assuming a distinction between bound and
referential pronouns, and even without assuming any syntactic representation of
anaphoric relations. In this respect, the account is certainly attractive, and one of the
reviewers of the present article even suggested that it may be possible to think of
Reinhart’s ‘two-step’ approach as ‘simulating’ the effects of the direct composi-
tional account.
I don’t think that this is exactly the right picture. Reinhart’s two-step approach
was motivated by the empirical observation that coreference sometimes seems to
escape the constraints that invariably apply to binding. Jacobson’s approach is
simpler, which is attractive from a methodological point of view, but—as she
herself notes—it does not yield any predictions regarding the supposed difference
between binding and coreference. To be sure, more empirical work is needed to
establish the exact differences between binding and coreference (see the remarks in
Sect. 2.2). But in any case, I don’t think that the ‘two-step’ approach should be
thought of as simulating the effects of a direct compositional account such as
Jacobson’s. It is really designed to capture certain distinctions that the latter account
does not deal with at all.
Now, apart from this issue, my main worry with the direct compositional account
is that, as it stands, it actually places certain restrictions on interpretation that have
nothing to do with Condition B effects per se. Jacobson (2007, p. 233) in fact
provides an example to illustrate this:
(44) Bill thinks that no one voted for him. him ¼ Bill
On the direct compositional account, this sentence does not entail that Bill thinks
that he didn’t vote for himself. It only entails that Bill thinks that no one else voted
for him. Jacobson argues that this prediction is in fact not all that bad: the ‘no one
else’ reading, which does indeed arise in this case, is usually explained on pragmatic
grounds, but in principle there is nothing against deriving it semantically. However,
I think that there are other cases where ‘no one’ is really read as ‘no one including
Bill’, while Jacobson’s account would still derive the ‘no one else’ reading. For
instance:
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(45) Context:
All club members, including Bill, elected a new president. The candidates
were Bill and Sue. The votes were submitted anonymously. Mary told us
that she had voted for Bill, but when we counted the votes it turned out that
she had lied.
Target sentence:
In fact, no one had voted for him.
(46) Context:
All club members, including Bill, elected a new president. The candidates
were Bill and Sue. The votes were submitted anonymously. Mary counted
them and announced the results.
Target sentence:
Mary told Bill that no one had voted for him.
(But Bill knew she was lying, because he had actually voted for himself.)
Thus, Jacobson’s account deals with Condition B effects in one fell swoop, but the
proposed mechanism is so strong that it also yields restrictions on interpretation
outside the realm of Condition B effects, which seems undesirable.
8 Conclusion
Building on the work of Reinhart, Heim, Fox, and Bu¨ring, we have arrived at a
theory that captures Condition B effects in two simple steps:
– Condition B: a syntactic constraint on binding (which may be derived from
primitive syntactic mechanisms, cf. Reuland 2001);
– Rule S: an interface strategy that constrains anaphoric relations other than
binding.
We have seen that the proposed theory only requires syntactic encoding of binding
relations (and not of other kinds of codetermination); it is compatible with a wide
range of theories of VP ellipsis; and, if correct, it provides support for the general
conceptual outlook of Reinhart (2006) and Reuland (2008).
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